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Chapter 1 
Background of the Study 
1. Background 
It is trite law that an accused person has the right to have adequate time and facilities to 
prepare his defence. This is one of the fundamental ingredients for a fair trial well-established 
in both domestic and international law. One specific requirement that emanates from fair trial 
guarantees is the right to disclosure of evidence. In this regard, the Rome Statute places an 
obligation on the prosecution to disclose material within its possession to facilitate the effective 
and timely preparation of the defence case. However, disclosure has been one of the most 
contentious procedural issues in the International Criminal Court (ICC).  
There are constant tensions caused by the prosecutions disclosure obligations. On the one 
hand, the defence has a right to disclosure and on the other the prosecution has a duty to 
disclose. This duality often brings about competing interest. Further, the restrictions on 
disclosure exacerbate the problem. For instance, article 67(2) of the ICC-Statute and Rule 77 of 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence require the prosecution to disclose potentially exculpatory 
evidence to the accused subject to restrictions on inter alia confidential information, witness 
protection and national security interests. In one given instance therefore, there may be 
tensions between confidentiality of information1 as well as the conflicts arising between the 
rights to disclosure on the one hand and the protection of witnesses and safeguarding of state 
                                                          
1  Typically, informants give information to the prosecution on the assurance of confidentiality, and some of 
this information may be potentially exculpatory. 
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national security interests on the other hand.2 The interest in safeguarding an on-going 
investigation may also clash with that of defence in disclosure. Such scenarios are often 
complicated and this is what makes disclosure of evidence complicated.  
In the Prosecutor v Lubanga,3 the Single Judge emphasized that disclosure must fully respect 
the accused right to a fair trial enshrined under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Individual Freedoms 
and the American Convention on Human Rights.4 But that the uniqueness of the ICC should 
address any possible tensions among the provisions of these conventions. In addition, the Judge 
opined that an effective disclosure regime should take into account the protection of victims, 
preservation of evidence, confidentiality of certain information and guarantee that victims are 
able to adequately exercise their procedural rights.5 The ruling however did not address the 
problem of how to solve the possible tensions that could result from conflicting rights of the 
accused and third parties such as witnesses, victims and information providers.  
Asides from the restrictions to full disclosure listed above, there are other conflicting interests 
presented by the regime. For instance, the Rome Statute obliges the prosecution to comply 
with the reasonable time standard in disclosing evidence. Where deadlines on disclosure are 
set by the Pre-Trial Chamber the interests of crime control and truth finding on the one hand 
conflict with those of efficient trial management and the rights of the accused on the other 
                                                          
2  The disclosure of witnesses for example may be important in the one hand and may interfere with witness 
protection on the other. The same holds true for confidential materials and information are likely to compromise 
confidentiality of agreements. 
3  The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC (PTC) Annex of 15 May 2006. 
4  Paragraph 4 of the Annex.  
5  Paragraph 6 of the Annex 
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hand.6 In some of the cases, there is a bulk of evidence obtained which may not allow the 
prosecution to put it in order and adhere to the reasonable time standard. Consequently, a 
substantial body of exculpatory evidence is either left undisclosed or disclosed late such that 
the defence lacks ample time to prepare for the trial. In such instance isn’t the accused person 
prejudiced? Also, there are some practical circumstances such as the number of suspects and 
witnesses involved as well as the nature of the crime that may further complicate the efficacy 
of disclosure. How therefore can both interests of the accused and of the prosecutorial 
authorities be sufficiently met? 
The main focus of this research paper is not on the general duty of disclosure by the 
Prosecutor, but on the conflicting interests presented by the right and duty to disclose. This 
research paper centres on the interests in confidentiality agreements, witness protection and 
national interests, as they have caused particular controversy in the ad hoc tribunals and still 
continue to be the cause significant challenges in the ICC proceedings. This paper will review a 
number of judicial decisions in order to assess the consistency and efficacy by the ICC in 
deciding disputes where there are conflicting interests.  Proposals are also made in an attempt 
to provide a harmonised disclosure regime which will act as a guide for the ICC and other 
international tribunals. This research recommends the balancing of competing interests to 
redress the constant conflicts in disclosure obligations. 
2. Problem Statement 
It is apparent that disclosure is an area of procedural conflicts and that there is an 
inherent challenge in harmonizing competing fairness concerns of all parties. While the ICC 
                                                          
6  Klamberg M (2013) 283. 
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jurisprudence concludes that all the above-mentioned interest are fundamental, practice is still 
indicative of the uncertainty as to whether the right to disclosure prevails over other interests 
or vice versa. In addition, the courts jurisprudence does not provide a clear cut indication on 
how the rights will be balanced in future cases. The current system which relies on the 
prosecutor to make a decision on what material to disclose, and only turns to the court in case 
of any doubt, does not facilitate fair disclosure either. As a result, the prosecution may be 
skewed to favour one right over another. For that reason, this research paper seeks to analyse 
the courts jurisprudence and look at their strengths and potential weaknesses as well as 
attempts to balance the said rights and interests.  
3. Significance of the Study 
The significance of this research is demonstrated by the fact that pre-trial disclosure is one of 
the most complex procedural rights in the ICC system which needs an effective remedy.  In 
Prosecutor V Thomas Dyilo Lubanga, the first ICC trial judgement, the Trial Chamber ordered 
two stays of proceedings resulting from non-disclosure by the Prosecution. It noted that the 
omission or any refusal of the Prosecution to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence 
sufficiently compromised the accused’s person’s right to a fair trial. As a result, the Lubanga 
trial almost collapsed. Rules of disclosure are therefore an important element in the criminal 
procedure and their importance in guaranteeing the right of a fair trial cannot be gainsaid. This 
research paper will contribute to a growing body of literature that aims to streamline the right 
to disclosure in the ICC system.  
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4. Research Questions 
The study seeks to answer the following questions: 
 What is the scope of the OTPs disclosure obligations? 
 Does non-disclosure amount to the violation of the right to a fair trial? 
 How can one strike a balance between competing interests presented by the right to 
disclosure? 
 To what extent can conflicts be resolved by the Pre-Trial Chamber? 
 Are there alternatives to the ICC disclosure regime? 
5. Argument to the Problem  
It is assumed that non-disclosure and the one sided balancing of competing interests in favour 
of the prosecution can have a negative effect on the right to a fair trial. It is further assumed 
that a simpler and well established disclosure system will minimize this shortcoming. The 
unbalanced system is supported by the fact that there are little guidelines on how all legitimate 
competing interests can be accommodate within the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. This 
research paper will address the problem presented by discussing the jurisprudence of the 
International Criminal Court. It is hypothesized that these conflicts are better resolved through 
a well-crafted disclosure system. Also it will examine how the ad hoc tribunals dealt with the 
issue of disclosure.  
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6. Structure of the Paper 
Chapter 1: Proposal 
This Chapter gives the general outline if the research. It focuses on the problem statement, 
significance of the study, research questions, hypothesis and methodology.  
Chapter 2: Introduction 
This Chapter gives a general introduction to the right of disclosure, the purpose of disclosure, 
the right to a fair trial and its nexus to disclosure, an introduction to the right to disclosure in 
international criminal law, the practice in civil law systems and the common law system, the 
principle of equality of arms, the prosecutions obligation to disclose evidence and the 
requirements for disclosure.  
Chapter 3: Prosecution Disclosure Obligations in International Criminal Tribunals and Domestic 
Jurisdictions 
This chapter discusses the right to disclosure in the International Military Tribunal, the 
International Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal of 
Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Special Tribunal of Lebanon and the 
Extraordinary Court of Cambodia. It will also look at how disclosure is regulated in civil law 
jurisdictions such as Germany and common law jurisdictions such as New Zealand.  
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Chapter 4: The Right to Disclosure at the International Criminal Court  
This Chapter discusses the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute and the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence. It also analyses the ICC jurisprudence as well as the competing interests that 
arise in the cases.  
Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations 
This Chapter includes the conclusion and recommendations of the study. It will also include a 
draft proposal for new regulations of disclosure for the ICC Statute.  
7. Research Methodology 
This research shall utilize a qualitative desktop study relying on both primary and secondary 
sources. It will critically examine and analyse these sources in order to develop answers to the 
research questions.  
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Chapter 2 
Introduction 
1. The Right to Disclosure  
Although it is true that courts must act firmly against persons who commit crimes, it is equally 
important that the fundamental rights of such persons are guaranteed. Therefore, the entire 
criminal justice system must provide an accused person with several rights to ensure a fair trial. 
Among these is the right to disclosure.  
In a broad sense disclosure means the act of revealing that which was previously unknown. In 
the context of criminal proceedings, the term refers to ‘the uncovering of evidence and other 
information between the parties of legal proceedings before and during these proceedings’.7 As 
a general rule the prosecution is required to disclose to the defence all the material that may 
either weaken or strengthen the defence case. And this rule has been accepted by several 
countries. The Law Commission of Ireland for example defines disclosure as  
‘[the] duty on the prosecution to disclose and to make available to the defence any 
material in the possession or procurement of the prosecution which may be relevant to 
the case which could either help the defence or damage the prosecution’.8 
Traditionally, disclosure was not explicitly included in many legal texts. Courts found this right 
to be part of more wide-ranging rights enshrined in many constitutions and human rights 
instruments (such as the right to make a defence, the right to have adequate time and facilities 
                                                          
7  Büngener L Disclosure of Evidence in International Criminal Trials - A Historical Overview (PhD Thesis, 
University of Marburg, 2012) 5.  
8  Law Reform Commission of Ireland ‘Issues Paper on Disclosure and Discovery in Criminal Cases’ available 
at http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/Issues%20Papers/ip5Disc.pdf (accessed 15/09/2015). 
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to prepare for a defence, and the right to a fair hearing). It is therefore ‘[an] example of the 
proliferation of implied rights that are the product of interpretation of basic and general 
norms’.9 In including disclosure in the ambit of other rights accorded to the accused, courts 
now see it as an integral part of the accused right to a fair trial. The underlying reason behind 
the inclusion of disclosure rights alongside other fundamental rights is that it is a critical tool for 
the accused to mount a meaningful defence.10  
When both the prosecution and the defence are cognizant of the arguments and evidence that 
the opposing sides intend to rely on, trials will run smoothly.11 For instance, the accused needs 
to know the identity of prosecution witnesses before the trial commences; only through such 
disclosure can the accused challenge the credibility of witnesses.12 From that view point, it is 
obvious that disclosure promotes efficient and fair trial. Additionally, where non-disclosure has 
a direct effect on the accused’s case, it may amount to a miscarriage of justice, depending on 
the overall circumstances of the case and the significance of the evidence concerned. 
Consequently, it is a ground for appeal in many criminal cases. 13  
Nonetheless, the complexity in disclosure arises in two instances. First, when the prosecutor is 
obligated to disclose both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. The prosecution is then forced 
to wear two hats - disclosing both evidence that may strengthen or weaken the defence’s case.  
Furthermore, whereas the prosecution is obliged to fully disclose evidence it is difficult to gauge 
                                                          
9  Langer M & Roach K ‘ Rights in the criminal process: a case study of convergence and disclosure rights’ in 
Tushnet M, Fleiner T & Saunders C (ed) Routledge Handbook of Constitutional Law (2013)275. .  
10  Langer M & Roach K (2015)275.  
11  Ashworth A & Redmayne M The Criminal Process (2010)259.  
12  Klamberg M (2013)269.  
13  Ashworth A & Redmayne M (2010)259.  
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whether material that ought to be disclosed was in fact disclosed. This is because at the first 
stage of collection of evidence, it is the prosecution which makes a decision on the exculpatory 
value of the evidence in its possession.14 Second is the fact that disclosure of evidence is not 
absolute. Limitations on the right to disclosure include inter alia confidentiality, witness 
protection and protection of national interests and the prosecution is allowed to withhold 
disclosure on such grounds. Disclosure then requires finding a balance between the limitations 
of the duty to disclose evidence and the rights of the accused person. Achieving this equilibrium 
becomes even more relevant when the prosecution withholds certain material subject to the 
limitations.  
Taking into account non-absolute and discretionary elements of the right and duty to 
disclosure, it is necessary to analyse whether there are appropriate safeguards to ensure the 
rights of the accused to a fair trial are upheld. Such safeguards may involve the harmonization 
of competing rights. This is because during trials the interest of the defendant to be informed 
about potentially exonerating evidence, the interest in protecting a witness who gave such 
evidence and the interest of safeguarding an ongoing investigation may all compete at a given 
instance.15 Such situations call for careful balancing of interests so as not to prejudice one 
party.  
 
 
                                                          
14  See Laucci C The Annotated Digest of the International Criminal Court (2014) 236.  
15  Fiori BM Disclosure of Information in Criminal Proceedings: A comparative analysis of national and 
international criminal procedural systems and human rights law (PhD Thesis, University of Groningen, 2015) 2. 
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2. The Purpose of Disclosure 
The right to disclosure of evidence is predominantly based on the concept of fair trial rights. 
This is because disclosure primarily seeks to protect the accused’s rights in criminal trials 
granting the accused adequate facilities for the preparation of the defence. Firstly, it aims to 
assist in the timely preparation of the accused’s case. Secondly, it ensures that non-contentious 
issues are resolved at the preliminary stages of the proceedings. In effect, disclosure facilitates 
the right to an expeditious trial. Thirdly, disclosure guarantees that there is equality of arms 
between the prosecution and the defence. Fourthly, it prevents trial by ambush where one 
party to the proceedings only learns of the other party’s evidence at the trial and it becomes 
practically impossible to rebut the evidence. Fifth, it encourages resolution of cases including in 
appropriate circumstances entering a guilty plea in the early stages of the proceedings.16 Lastly, 
it enables the court to make an informed determination on the innocence or guilt of the 
accused person and prevent wrongful convictions.  
3. Disclosure of Evidence as a Precondition to a Fair Trial  
3.1 The Right to a Fair Trial  
The concept of a fair trial is an ‘umbrella notion’ as it includes minimum guarantees that ensure 
the equitable dispensation of justice.17 It is also included in article 10 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which provides that ‘everyone is entitled in full equality to 
a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his 
                                                          
16  ROFE Q.C ‘Disclosure by both sides’ available at 
http://www.aic.gov.au/media_library/conferences/prosecuting/rofe.pdf (accessed 15/09/2015).  
17  Acquaviva G, Combs N, Heikikila M et al ‘Trial Process’ in Sluiter G, Friman H, Linton S et al (ed) 
International Criminal Procedure: Principles and Rules (2013) 773.  
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rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him’.18 Most human rights instruments 
and statutes of international criminal courts and tribunals, as will be seen later in this research 
paper, also provide for the right to a fair trial.  
In addition to the UDHR, the standards of fairness have been clearly set out in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and have been adopted in international tribunals 
and courts.19 Article 14(3) (b) of the ICCPR provides for certain ‘minimum guarantees’ that 
should be afforded to accused. It states: ‘[in] the determination of any criminal charge against 
him, everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality: To have 
adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence’. Such guarantees are purely 
procedural in nature and create a benchmark of fairness in any criminal trial.  
The notion ‘adequate facilities’ presupposes that the accused or his defence is granted access 
to information and documents for the preparation of his defence.20 Such access ensures prior 
knowledge of the prosecution’s case which is the right to disclosure of evidence. The ICCPR 
requires in mandatory terms that such guarantees are available to the defence.21 While it is 
clear that the fair trial guarantees are non-derogatory what is in issue here is whether non-
disclosure amounts to a breach of a fair trial.  
                                                          
18  Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
19  The minimum guarantees of a fair trial in Article 14 of the ICCPR have been fair trial guarantees of Article 
14 of the ICCPR have been codified almost verbatim by International Tribunals. See Article 21 of the ICTY Statute 
and Article 20 of the ICTR Statute 
20  Tochilovsky V Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Courts and the European Court of Human Rights: 
Procedure and Evidence (2007)95.  
21
  Despite the fact that neither the UDHR nor the ICCPR are directly applicable to the ICC, one could argue 
that at least the ICCPR can be viewed as an applicable treaty under Article 21(1) (b) of the Rome Statute. 
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It is undisputed that non-disclosure can generate significant delays in a trial; through the late 
commencement of trials, adjournments or stays of proceedings. It may also deny the accused 
access to important information and evidence. Such conduct has a direct impact on the accused 
persons’ defence, thus infringing on his fundamental rights to fair and expeditious trial.22 In the 
Lubanga trial, the Trial Chamber concluded that a fair trial could not be achieved due to the 
non-disclosure by the prosecutor. But, it is also agreed that when singly looked at the right of 
fairness of the accused must be balanced with other rights.23  
3.2 The Principle of Equality of Arms as an Important Element of a Fair Trial  
Although Article 14 of the ICCPR does not expressly refer to the principle of ‘Equality of Arms’ it 
is agreed that the concept is an essential element of a fair trial.24 The notion of equality is a 
‘scale through which the requisite procedural fairness in any criminal proceeding can be 
measured’.25 The principle requires that each party to the trial must be granted the same 
possibility to present his case without being placed at a substantial disadvantage vis-à vis his 
opponent. 26  
In practice, the prosecution is more advantaged as opposed to the defence in terms of finance, 
funds, personnel as well as investigative techniques. And it is impossible for the defence to 
                                                          
22  Amann G ‘The Disclosure Regime Before The ICC: The Right to a Fair Trial’ available at 
http://www.heritagetpirdefense.org/papers/Gabriel_Amman_Disclosure_Regime_Before_ICC.pdf (accessed 
28/04/2015) 
23  Fair trial recognizes other interests that need to be protected such as the victims and witnesses, 
confidential information amongst others.  
24  Cited in Amann G ‘The Disclosure Regime Before The ICC: The Right to a Fair Trial’ 
http://www.heritagetpirdefense.org/papers/Gabriel_Amman_Disclosure_Regime_Before_ICC.pdf (accessed 
28/04/2015)  
25  Osasona T “Equality of Arms” and its effect on the quality of justice at the ICC’ available at 
http://acontrarioicl.com/2014/04/10/equality-of-arms-and-its-effect-on-the-quality-of-justice-at-the-icc/ 
(accessed on 28/04/2015) 
26  Fiori BM (2015)118.  
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match this because of its limited resources.27 The mismatch is even broader in international 
trials. While the prosecution in most instances commences investigations and collects evidence 
years before the trial begins, the defence starts its investigation at a much later stage. As a 
result, the defence heavily relies on the evidence gathered by the prosecution.  
Disclosure therefore becomes an essential tool through which the defence acquires its 
information. It is in fact a ‘practical expression of the principal of equality of arms’28 as it aims 
to cure the imbalance between the prosecution and the defence. The concept of equality of 
arms guarantees equal opportunities for both the defendant and the prosecution to present 
their cases regardless of their advantaged or disadvantaged positions. Moreover, there can be 
no sincere equality if the prosecution is allowed to withhold information from the defence. 
Thus, the right to fair trial and equality of arms are inseparable.  
4. Different Legal Traditions: Disclosure in the Adversarial and Inquisitorial Systems 
While fair trial guarantees are universally accepted, the rules and dynamics of disclosure are 
largely dependent on the legal tradition governing it. In principle, there are distinctive criminal 
procedures in two major legal traditions: the common law/adversarial system and the civil law 
/inquisitorial system. And one way to capture the differences is by highlighting their contrasting 
features i.e. the role of the judges and parties to the proceedings.  
In a typical adversarial system, there are two adversaries, the prosecution and the defence, 
who present their cases before an impartial judge. In this system, the judge is an umpire and 
                                                          
27  Fiori BM (2015) 230.  
28  Fiori BM (2015)231.  
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acts as a referee between the two adversaries.29 More importantly, the prosecution and 
defence have equal powers and rights to investigate and present their cases. In an inquisitorial 
system however, the main trial is dominated by the judge who decides the order in which 
evidence is taken and who evaluates the collected evidence. The system entails ‘unitary 
investigation’30 where the judge assumes the role of the chief interrogator of the witnesses and 
the defendant. The prosecution is in charge of the investigation of evidence but the defence 
has little or no power to conduct its investigations and therefore solely relies on the 
prosecution for evidence. Contrary to the adversarial model, the prosecution is an independent 
agent rather than a party to the proceedings.31 This unitary model is seen as a system that aims 
to get to the truth through thorough investigation and examination of evidence. But I will not 
dwell on the entire debate on how inquisitorial and adversarial systems work; I will only limit 
my research to the different disclosure models.  
Both systems have adopted different terminologies to refer to the process of unveiling 
evidence in the two systems. The Common law system, for example, refers to it as the right to 
disclosure and the notion entails the exchange of evidence by both parties to the proceedings. 
The general idea is that disclosure takes place inter-parties during the trial while judges ‘watch 
from the sidelines’.32 The inquisitorial system on the other hand refers to the process as 
discovery or the right to access the file, Akteneinsichtsrecht in German, droit de consulter le 
                                                          
29  Cryer R, Friman H, Robinson D et al An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure 2 ed 
(2010) 426.  
30  Langer M ‘The Long Shadow of the Adversarial and Inquisitorial Categories’ in Dubber MD & Hörnle T (ed) 
The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law ( 2014) 895.  
31  Ambos K ‘International criminal procedure: “adversarial”, “inquisitorial” or mixed?’3 International 
Criminal Law Review (2003)9.  
32   Heinsch R, ‘How to achieve fair and expeditious trial proceedings before the ICC: Is it time for a more 
judge-dominated approach?’ in Stahn C & Sluite G The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
(2009)488.  
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dossier in French, and derecho a examinar el expediente in Spanish.33 Here, a compilation of 
documentary record of evidence, referred to as the dossier, is given to the accused. The 
evidence gathered by the police and the prosecution no longer belongs solely to the 
prosecution it becomes open to the defence. Those who argue in favour of the inquisitorial 
system suggest that it avoids problems of disclosure that are characteristic in an adversarial 
system.  
Whichever way one looks at the two systems, it is agreed that disclosure/ discovery is 
paramount to the accused’s case. Besides this agreement, both systems grapple with the 
limitations of disclosure. How they deal with the limitations is heavily dependent on their 
different formal structures already described. Civil law countries, for example, focus on how to 
accommodate competing rights within the dossier system. Conversely, common law countries 
adopt an approach of expressly restricting disclosure in certain instances.34 This discussion is 
central to this research paper as it will lay a background for discussion on the type of the 
disclosure regimes employed by the ICC and international criminal tribunals as well as a 
comparative study of different models of disclosure.  
5. The Right to Disclosure in International Criminal Proceedings 
International criminal law aims to ensure that perpetrators of international crimes are 
prosecuted. Just as in domestic criminal proceedings, it is essential that the process is 
legitimate. Thus international tribunals are obliged to develop laws and procedures that 
guarantee fairness throughout the trial. The benchmark was laid down by a UN Secretary 
                                                          
33  Langer M & Roach K (2013) 275.  
34  Langer M & Roach K (2013) 276-279.  
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General report in 1993 stating that it is paramount that the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) adheres fully to human rights standards such as the ones set out 
in Article 14 of the ICCPR.35 Besides, the tribunals have adopted procedures to meet these 
standards. It is noteworthy that that procedure before them has immensely developed. For 
instance, the Nuremberg IMT Rules of Procedure for instance comprised only 11 rules, the 
Tokyo International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) comprised only nine rules, the ad 
hoc tribunals contained, in contrast, more than 150 rules and the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence of the ICC comprises 225 Rules.36  
Regrettably, prosecuting perpetrators of international crimes gives rise to unique evidentiary 
challenges.37 The primary challenge that arises in all international criminal tribunals concerns 
the disclosure of evidence. This is due to the fact that international proceedings are much more 
complicated than domestic trials. Most of the courts investigations take place in countries rife 
with conflict.38  Thus witnesses and victims are often fragile and security interests are also at 
stake.39 This poses a special challenge to prosecuting international crimes and to disclosure in 
particular where there is an eminent risk in disclosing evidence.   
Antonio Cassese also notes that the international context is faced with obstinate challenges 
such as the sheer volume of evidence, measures that permit delayed disclosure, non-
cooperation by state authorities as well as the limitations on disclosure.40 Thus avoiding these 
                                                          
35           Report of the UN Secretary General, S/25704, 3 May 1993. 
36  Büngener L (2012) 2. 
37  Combs N A ‘Evidence’ (2011) in Shabas W & Bernaz N Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law 
(2011) 323.  
38  Whitting A (2015) 1008. 
39  Whitting A (2015) 1008. 
40  Cassese A, Gaeta P, Baig L et al Cassese's International Criminal Law 3 ed (2013) 372.  
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problems also requires an effective information management system that permits disclosure of 
large volumes of information and leaving out irrelevant ones.41 
Another challenge is that the defence heavily relies on the evidence collected by the 
prosecution. In fact, most of the potentially favourable evidence is obtained by the prosecution. 
As compared to the defence, the prosecution has vast power to conduct investigations. 
Typically the bulk of evidence is gathered by the prosecutor from information givers such as the 
United Nations are much keener to cooperate with the OTP rather than with a private person-
such as the defendant.42 Cooperating with the former signifies the international support for the 
crime while helping the accused is abhorred for obvious reasons. Hence, the heavy reliance on 
evidence obtained by the prosecution.  
In turn, the defence often complains that the Prosecution failed to comply with its disclosure 
obligations. The Prosecution responds by either disputing the claim or acknowledging the 
omission. The judges, on the other hand, assess whether there was inadvertence on the part of 
the prosecution and whether the materials should have been disclosed.43 Where in fact there 
was malfeasance, the judges, in limited circumstances, give sanctions. More likely, the 
prosecution is only urged to comply with its obligations. Different accounts of this kind of 
litigation have played out again and again at the international tribunals.44 
                                                          
41  Cassese A, Gaeta P, Baig L et al Cassese's International Criminal Law 3 ed (2013) 372.  
42  Caianiello M ‘Disclosure before the ICC: The Emergence of a New Form of Policies Implementation 
System in International Criminal Justice?’ (2010) 10 International Criminal Law Review 34.  
43  Whitting A ‘Disclosure Challenges at the ICC’ in Carsten Stahn (ed) The Law and Practice of the 
International Criminal Court (2015) 1007.  
44  Whitting A (2015) 1007.  
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Given the uniqueness and conceivable challenges posed by international prosecutions, it does 
not come as a surprise that there are crucial shortcomings with regard to disclosure. This is 
supported by case law. In the Krstić case before the ICTY, the Prosecution failed to disclose to 
the defence the fact that two of the witnesses were a subject of separate prosecution 
investigations.45 The fact that the witnesses apparently were of questionable character should 
have been disclosed to the accused. In the Bagosora case at the ICTR, the Trial Chamber 
neglected the accused’s right to disclosure in favour of witness protection without giving any 
convincing justification.46  
The ICC has also had its fair share of problems on the subject of disclosure. The first 
proceedings before the ICC proved difficult where the trial almost came to a halt because of 
numerous failures by the prosecution to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence. The Trial 
Chamber in the Lubanga trial asserted that the non-disclosure had reached such an intolerable 
level that it was ‘now impossible to piece together the constituent elements of a fair trial’. The 
Chamber therefore ordered two instances a stay of proceedings that almost terminated the 
proceedings. Until recently, the prosecution in the Bemba case47 has failed to disclose all 
relevant material to the defence. In the Gbagbo case, the prosecution failed to disclose witness 
statements with no valid reasons.48 
The problem is intensified by the lack of concise and clear disclosure rules which gives the 
judges a wide discretion to define appropriate standards.   
                                                          
45  Prosecutor v Krstić, ICTY (AC), Judgement of 19 April 2004, para. 204. 
46  Pozen J ‘Justice Obscured: The Non-Disclosure of Witnesses’ Identities in ICTR Trials’ (2006) 38 N.Y.U. J. 
Int’L L. & Pol. 298-322.  
47  Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC (PTC) decision of 15 June 2009 ICC-01/05-01/08. 
48  Prosecutor v Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Goude ICC (TC) decision 21 August 2015, Para 13. 
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6. Conclusion 
This chapter has established that the right to disclosure is an essential tool in criminal trials. It 
plays an essential role in ensuring that the rights of the accused are guaranteed and that there 
is equality of arms between the prosecution and the defence. But as a procedural issue, the 
right to disclosure cannot be looked at singly; it must be assessed against the background the 
whole procedural system. Thus to assess the complexity of the subject, disclosure must be 
looked at through the perspective of the prosecutor, defense/accused, as well as all other 
actors in the entire criminal justice system whose interests are affected by the right. 
International trials however are more complex and the need to have an effective disclosure 
system is apparent.  
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Chapter 3 
Prosecution Disclosure Obligations in International Criminal Tribunals and Domestic 
Jurisdictions 
1. International Tribunals 
1.1 International Military Tribunal 
The Nuremberg trial marks the first time in history that major war criminals who committed 
gross human rights violations were brought before an international tribunal.  The trial was 
based on the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg which is considered as 
the ‘birth certificate’ of international criminal law.49 Compared to the Statues on other 
international tribunals, the charter was rudimentary and fragmentary with only 30 articles.  
The drafting of the procedural rules was left to the discretion of the judges of the tribunal. 50 
Similar to the IMT Statute, the procedural rules were rudimentary and only contained 11 
provisions. Article 16 of the IMT Charter is the principle disclosure provision, at least on the face 
value. It provides that: 
In order to ensure fair trial for the Defendants, the following procedure shall be 
followed:  
(a) The Indictment shall include full particulars specifying in detail the charges against 
the Defendants [and a copy] shall be furnished to the Defendant at reasonable time 
before the Trial.  
                                                          
49   Werle G & Jessberger F  Principles of International Criminal Law 3 ed (2014)5.  
50  Article 13 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal. 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
This provision is complemented by Rule 2 of the RPE which provides for the timeline for such 
disclosure. There were no specific rules relating to the manner and restrictions of disclosure. 
Regrettably, the defence counsels were not permitted to access the prosecution's files of 
evidence51 and the prosecution was under no obligation to disclose evidence in favour of the 
accused.  
Much of the evidence relied on during the Nuremberg Trials was documentary thus disclosure 
disputes rarely came into play. For instance, questions of confidentiality agreements were 
seldom addressed. However with regard to the identity of witnesses, the prosecution called its 
witnesses, on the ninth day of the trial, without disclosing their identity of the witness prior to 
the trial. Among other reasons for the non-disclosure were security policy reasons.  
The fact that the untenable political situation during the Nazi era was difficult, it is easy to 
understand the importance of witness security and protection. Despite this, most of the 
disclosure obligations were not obeyed by the prosecution. Such a weak procedural framework 
could not allow the prosecution to adhere to the present disclosure obligations set by 
international tribunals.  
 
 
 
                                                          
51  May R & Wierda M ‘Trends in International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague and Arusha’  
37 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 756.  
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2. The Ad hoc Tribunals: Disclosure Rules in Proceedings Before the International Criminal 
Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia and International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda 
2.1 Overview and Legal Framework  
The system of disclosure in the ad hoc tribunals is more developed than that of the IMT. 
Procedurally, the ICTY and ICTR have developed a significant body of rules relating to the 
disclosure of evidence drawing on aspects of both adversarial and inquisitorial systems in an 
effort to balance the rights of the accused, to protect the ends of justice and to enhance the 
efficiency of proceedings.  The judges have also given special attention to the right of a fair trial. 
More importantly, the two tribunals have gone far beyond the legacy of Nuremberg IMT by 
establishing watertight procedures that guarantee fairness in the proceedings. The rules on 
disclosure in both tribunals are incidental, thus this research paper will discuss them in tandem.  
Generally, the prosecution has extensive disclosure obligations which also cover exculpatory 
evidence. Rule 68 (A) of the ICTR and ICTY RPE, oblige the prosecutor to disclose to the defence, 
as soon as practicable, any material which in the actual knowledge of the Prosecutor may 
suggest the innocence or mitigate the guilt of the accused or affect the credibility of 
Prosecution evidence.52 In the Kupreškić case the court opined that:  
‘…the Prosecutor of the Tribunal is not, or not only, a Party to adversarial proceedings 
but is an organ of the Tribunal and an organ of international criminal justice whose 
object is not simply to secure a conviction but to present the case for the Prosecution, 
                                                          
52  Based on the broad concept of disclosure the defence and prosecution conceive what amounts to 
exculpatory evidence differently. This problem arose in Prosecutor v Cermak in the ICTR. The prosecution alleged 
that there was a Joint Criminal Enterprise to forcibly move Serbians to Croatia but failed to disclose evidence of 
hatred for the Serbs by the local Croatian forces. The prosecution contended that this evidence was not 
exculpatory, but the Chamber disagreed. 
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which includes not only inculpatory, but also exculpatory evidence, in order to assist the 
Chamber to discover the truth in a judicial setting’.53 
Yet, the ICTY Trial Chamber in Blagojević et al., concluded that the obligation to disclose 
exculpatory evidence does not replace the defence’s investigations.54 In essence the 
prosecution is not required to identify the material being disclosed as exculpatory. But practice 
may demand so. As for the defence, it must only disclose information when it intends to raise 
an alibi defence or any special defences. In the event that the parties do not comply with their 
disclosure obligations, the court may provide a sanction or apply other appropriate measures. 
55 
Certain materials, however, are exempted from the disclosure, such as the prosecutions 
internal documents. There is also provision in the Rules to protect informants and information 
which may prejudice ongoing investigations, or may affect the security interests of any State.56 
To complicate the matter, the prosecution is under a number of specific obligations to disclose 
evidence of an exculpatory nature to the defence ‘as soon as practicable.’ In such 
circumstances, the prosecution may apply to the Court in camera to be relieved from its 
disclosure obligations.  
Each ground of restricting disclosure gives rise to competing interests either between the 
accused and the prosecution or between other third parties and the defence. In ensuring that 
the proceedings before the tribunals are fair, due regard must be taken for the protection of all 
                                                          
53  Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et.al, ICTY (TC) Decision of 21 September 1998, para. (ii). 
54  Blagojević et al., ICTY (TC) Decision of 12 December 2002, para. 26. 
55  Schun C International criminal Procedure: A Clash of Legal Cultures (2010) 111.  
56  See rules 66(C) and 68 (C) (D). 
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interest. It then becomes clear that the ad hoc tribunals have to determine the most 
appropriate response to any application by either party of the proceedings to either introduce 
or withhold evidence.57  
2.2 Restrictions on Disclosure  
2.2.1 Confidential Information 
Both the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC share analogous provisions with regard to confidential 
information. Rule 70(B) of the ICTY and ICTR provides that persons or entities can provide the 
prosecutor with information on the basis of confidentiality, to be used solely for the purpose of 
generating new evidence. Disclosure of such information is subject to the consent of the 
information provider. While such non-disclosure may prejudice the accused, the Trial Chamber 
has the power to exclude evidence if ‘its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
need to ensure a fair trial’58  
2.2.2 The Disclosure of Witness Identities 
The basic right of the accused person to examine witnesses, read together with the right to 
have adequate time and facilities to prepare the defence envisages more than a ‘blind 
confrontation in the courtroom’.59 The defence basically has a right to know the identity of the 
prosecution witness. Analogous to this is the argument that the use of anonymous witnesses 
infringes upon the accused’s right to cross-examination of the witnesses.  
                                                          
57  Klip A & Sluiter G Annotated Leading Cases of International Criminal Tribunals:  The International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 1997-1999 (2001)282.  
58  Rule 89(D) 
59  Tochilovsky VJurisprudence of the International Criminal Courts and the European Court of Human Rights: 
Procedure and Evidence (2008)106.  
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2.2.2.1 Delayed Disclosure 
During the pre-trial stage, the prosecution may request the chamber not to disclose the identity 
of a witness. 60 But, there must be exceptional circumstances in which a witness would be at 
risk or in danger to allow for delayed disclosure. Thus the fears of danger by potential witnesses 
do not establish any real likelihood of danger. There must be some ‘objective foundation for 
those fears’.61 Any delay in disclosure therefore is permitted only to the extent that the 
defences right to adequately prepare for the trial is not prejudiced.62 Pursuant to Rule 75(A), 
the Trial Chamber may order protective measures which do not prejudice the rights of the 
accused.  
Unlike the ICTR, the ICTY Rules however do not prescribe a time limit for disclosure of witness 
identities where delay is permitted. Rule 66(A) (ii) provides that the identity of witnesses should 
be disclosed ‘in sufficient time’ to allow the defence adequate time to prepare its defence.  The 
notion of ‘sufficient time’ is determined on a case to case basis depending on the particular 
circumstances of the case.63  
However, it is noted that the degree of risk on witness is directly dependent on the time 
between when the identity of the witness has been disclosed and when he has to give 
evidence64 -the longer the time the greater the risk. Thus the Trial Chamber has balance 
                                                          
60  Rule 69 
61  Prosecution v Brdanin and Talic ICTY(TC) Decision of 8 November 2000, para 13 
62  See Rule 69 of the ICTY and ICTR Rules. 
63  Prosecutor v Seselji, ICTY (TC) Decision of 22 November 2006, para 17.  
64  Prosecution v Brdanin and Talic ICTY (TC) para 13.  
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between the length of time necessary to disclose the identity of the witness, the safety of the 
witness as well as adequate time needed for the defence to investigate the witnesses.  
2.2.2.2 Witness Anonymity 
The impact of witness anonymity on disclosure is clear.  The accused does not get a chance to 
know the identity of his accuser; he cannot investigate the witness and cannot challenge the 
credibility of witnesses.65 In addition, the defence cannot verify witness statements where it 
cannot understand the contents. But at the same time, disclosing such witness identity may 
pose a risk to the witnesses as a result of their potential testimonies. 66 In this regard, Rule 69 
allows the prosecution to either delay its Rule 66 obligations to the extent that the witness may 
be in danger.  
The issue of witness protection and witness anonymity arose in the ICTY’s first trial, namely 
Prosecutor v Tadic, where the prosecution made an application to the court to withhold the 
identity of its witnesses from not only the media but also the defence. At the time of the trial, 
the ICTY Statute was silent on what exact limitations could be allowed when it concerns 
curtailing defences rights so as to protect the rights of witnesses, and under what 
circumstances such limitations would apply. 67 Hence up to now, there is no clear guidance 
regarding this issue; the ICC will have to establish whether the use of anonymous witnesses is 
permitted. Nonetheless, the ICTY allowed witness identities to be withheld from the defence.  
                                                          
65  Tochilovsky V (2008)111.  
66  Einarsdóttir KÓ (2010) 36.  
67  Knoops G An Introduction to the Law of International Criminal Tribunals: A Comparative Study 2 ed (2014) 
260.  
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The first attempt to balancing interests was also in the Tadic decision. But the balance would 
only operate in exceptional circumstances. The Trial Chamber therefore laid out five criteria to 
determine anonymity:  
‘[f]irst and foremost, there must be real fear for the safety of the witness or her or his 
family [...]. Secondly, the testimony of the particular witness must be important to the 
Prosecutor's case [...]. Thirdly, the Trial Chamber must be satisfied that there is no prima 
facie evidence that the witness is untrustworthy [...]. Fourthly, the ineffectiveness or 
non-existence of a witness protection programme is another point that has been 
considered in domestic law and has a considerable bearing on any decision to grant 
anonymity in this case [...]. Finally, any measures taken should be strictly necessary’.68 
However the court opined that the rights of the accused can be sacrificed for witness safety.  
The Tadic decision was mechanically transposed to the ICTR jurisprudence. Joanna Pozen 
however notes the ICTRs decision to shield the identity of the victims makes little sense.69 It 
relied on the decision justifying the shielding of witnesses by the on-going war in Yugoslavia, 
while testifying in Rwanda presented lesser risk to the witnesses. Thus to refuse disclosure of 
evidence on the basis of witness protection is not practical.  
Notably, the Trial Chamber in the Kupreškić ordered disclosure of the identity of witnesses and 
requested the Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities and the International Police Task Force to 
investigate and prosecute any incidents of witness intimidation.70 In another instance, the Trial 
Chamber in Milutinović et al. refused to hear the witnesses based on the fact that it would 
                                                          
68  Tadic, para 62-66. 
69  Joanna Pozen (2006) 283.  
70  Prosecution v Kupreškić et al  ICTY (TC) decision of 21 May 1998.  
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adversely affect the fairness of the trial.71 The decisions contrasts with the Trial Chambers 
approach in the Milošević case where conditions requested by the US pursuant to Rule 70 
which allowed the witnesses to inter alia give evidence in a private session in order to protect 
the national security interests of the United States were granted.72 As a result, cross 
examination was solely within the statements disclosed by the prosecution. The effect of the 
Trial Chambers ruling is that the accused person could not cross examine the witness on 
potentially exculpatory evidence-which was in fact disclosed to the court in a private session.73  
None of these cases provide a defined framework on how to balance both interest. In each 
case, there are different ways in which the court decided to strike a balance. What is clear 
however is that the court acknowledges the significance of witness protection but is more 
inclined to favour the accused right to the identity of witnesses whom the prosecution intends 
to rely on to prove the guilt of the accused.74 In the Milosevic decision where the court noted 
that the rights of the accused should be given primary consideration and that the need to 
protect witnesses is a secondary one.75 The ICC does not take a similar approach.  
2.2.3 National Security Interests 
Both the ICTY and ICTR Statutes endorse specific requirements to advance the protection of 
national security interests.  In particular, Rule 66(C) of the ICTY RPE limits the general obligation 
of disclosure by the Prosecutor with concerns of national security. The Blaškic Judgement noted 
                                                          
71  Milutinović et al ICTY (TC) decision of 16 February 2007. 
72  Milošević  ICTY (TC) Decision on Prosecution’s Application For a Witness Pursuant to Rule 70(B) 30 
October 2003;  
73  O’Sullivan E & Montgomery D ‘The Erosion of the Right to Confrontation under the Cloak of Fairness at 
the ICTY 8 (2) Journal of International Criminal Justice (2010) 534.  
74  Prosecutor v Haradinaj et al, ICTY (TC) decision of 22 November 2006 para 3.  
75  Milosevic, ICTY (TC) 19 February 2002, para 23.  
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that this blanket provision on national security would undermine the functioning of the ICTY 
because in most occasions it’s the states which have information relating to armed conflicts 
that triggered the jurisdiction of tribunals. Thus the tribunal asserted that claims based on 
national security interests could defeat the purpose of the tribunal as such documents or 
information (in possession of the state) could be vital in determining the guilt or innocence of 
the accused. 76 On the other hand, the United States claimed in the Milutinovic case that the 
disclosure obligation concerning national security concerns puts the ICTY ‘into conflict with 
States over the protection of their national security interest and makes it significantly more 
difficult for States to cooperate in providing such information to the parties in Tribunal 
proceedings77’. A similar conflict exists for Article 29 of the ICTY Statute which provides that 
‘States shall comply without undue delay with any request for assistance or order issued by a 
Trial Chamber’. 
The matter of national security interests is however a complex.  Illustrative of this is the Blaškic 
case where Croatia proclaimed that once a state withholds information on grounds of its 
national security interests, this assertion must be accepted by the international tribunal.78 In 
addition, it challenged the coercive powers of international tribunals noting that states only 
have an obligation to cooperate with international tribunals, and this does not give them any 
coercive authority over state.79  Any attempts therefore to exercise such an authority would fail 
and may also threaten cooperation between the international tribunals and states. This is also 
true for the ICC.  
                                                          
76  Prosecutor v Milutinovic, ICTY (TC) Judegment of 12 May 2006 Para 65 
77  Blaškic (AC). 
78  Blaškić (AC) 135.  
79  Blaškić (AC) 71.  
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The real danger in withholding disclosure from the accused was evident in the Blaškic case. The 
defendant Thomir Blaškic was indicted and convicted of crimes against humanity and war 
crimes. 80  After the conviction of the defendant, the Croatian authorities announced that they 
had discovered potentially exculpatory evidence. This was after the death of the president who 
had opposed disclosure of documents requested during the trial. On appeal, the Appeals 
Chamber, relying on the new evidence disclosed by Croatia, reversed 16 out of 19 convictions 
and reduced Blaškic sentence to nine years imprisonment.81 This scenario shows that the fair 
trial rights to a defendant may be jeopardised by a state’s objection of disclosing evidence on 
the grounds of national security interests. Thus the Appeals Chamber opined that states cannot 
unilaterally refuse to disclose evidence on the grounds of national security.  
Importantly, the Blaškic decision held that it had the powers to ‘scrutinise the validity of States’ 
security interests. In contrast, the ICC does not exercise this option. To mitigate any problems 
arising from restricting disclosure, the court also found it acceptable for the State itself to 
remove parts in the documents that contain the sensitive information.82 
3. Special Court for Sierra Leone  
The Special Court for Sierra Leone’s disclosure system is highly influenced by that of the ICC and 
the ad hoc tribunals. Rule 68 of the RPE obliges the Prosecution to disclose exculpatory 
evidence to the defence. The Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v Charles Taylor, placed the onus on 
                                                          
80  Blaškic ICTY (TC) Judgment, 3 March 2000.  
81  Blaškic ICTY (AC) Judgement, 29 July 2004.  
82  Blaškic ICTY(AC) para 67 
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the defence to establish that the prosecution has breached its disclosure obligations. The 
defence must: 
a. identify the evidence sought with requisite specificity; 
b. show the exculpatory or potentially exculpatory nature of the evidence requested; 
c. show that the prosecution is in custody or control of the requested evidence; 
d. show that the prosecution has failed to disclose the exculpatory evidence.83   
This is a very high threshold for the defence since most of the evidence is primarily obtained 
and is in possession of the prosecution. The position of the court on competing rights in 
Prosecution v Allieu Kondewa84 is that trying to balance the two rights would violate the rights 
of one party in one way or the other.  
4. Special Tribunal of Lebanon 
There is no direct mention of disclosure in the Special tribunal of Lebanon Statute -the concept 
is extensively dealt with in the Rules of Procedure and evidence. The tribunal majorly follows a 
common law approach to disclosure where the judges do not actively participate in the 
disclosure process. It is important to note that the Rules of the Special Tribunal is contains rules 
that specifically deal with counter balancing of conflicting interests. Where the prosecution 
makes an application not to disclose information, it shall provide reasons for such an 
application sought to be kept confidential, together with a statement relating to the proposed 
counterbalancing measures. Such include inter alia; identification of new, similar information, 
                                                          
83  Prosecutor v Charles Taylor SLCL (TC) decision of 23 September 2010 para 15.  
84  Prosecutor v Allieu Kondewa, SCSL (TC) 10 October, 2003. 
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provision of the information in summarized or redacted form, or stipulation of the relevant 
facts.85  
Also, the Tribunal may play a role in the counter balancing efforts by ordering appropriate 
counterbalancing efforts.86 And if no such measures are available to sufficiently protect the 
accused’s right to a fair trial, the Prosecutor shall be given the option of either amending or 
withdrawing the charges to which the material relates or disclosing the material. There is still 
no jurisprudence indicating how the counter balancing works. 
5. Extraordinary Court of Cambodia (ECCC)  
The rules of disclosure at the Extra Ordinary Courts of Cambodia are civil law oriented as the 
pre-trial judge has extensive powers to gather evidence.87 Disclosure here is done by the co-
investigating judges using a “case file”.88 When an investigation has been opened by the co-
prosecutors, they shall refer the case to the co-investigating judges and hand over case file to 
the judges-containing both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. 89 All parties are allowed to 
access the file. This appears to be immensely advantageous to the defence as opposed to the 
ICC and ad hoc tribunals. While disclosure at the ECCC is a continuing obligation, late disclosure 
may lead to exclusion of the evidence.90 This is also a significant remedy as compared to other 
tribunals.  
 
                                                          
85  Rule 116 B 
86  Rule 116 C of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
87  Rule of the ECC Rules. 
88  Article 35 of the ECCC Statute. 
89  ECCC Internal Rules, rule 53(1) and (2).  
90  See Prosecutor v Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, ECCC (TC) 2 July 2009 paras. 3-11.  
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6. Domestic Jurisdictions 
6.1 Germany 
The German disclosure regime is useful to study for several reasons. The rules on the access of 
the dossier provide a good example of the inquisitorial approach to disclosure. At the same 
time, the German model aligns with arguments for early and extensive discovery of evidence as 
a central feature of a fair criminal process.91 In addition, the system provides measures which 
may accommodate both the right to disclosure (referred to as discovery in civil law 
jurisdictions) and witness protection.  
The German criminal code uses the term Akteneinsichtsrecht to refer to discovery of evidence. 
The process of discovery is regulated under section 147 of the German Criminal Procedure 
Code. As a practical matter, the defence is allowed to access the entire prosecution file or 
dossier. However, it is only the defence counsel who is allowed to access the prosecution 
dossier.92 Where the accused person has no defence, copies of information and files shall be 
made available to him or her provided that such information is necessary for an adequate 
defence. In such instances, such provision should not endanger the purpose of the 
investigation.93 
The dossier contains evidence gathered by the prosecution and police or any state investigating 
agency and may contain both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. Full access to the dossier is 
allowed with some exception made to witness safety, work product and the integrity of 
                                                          
91  Turner JI ‘Plea Bargaining and Disclosure in Germany and the United States: Comparative Lessons’ 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2659372  (accessed 1/10/2015) 7.  
92  Bohlander M Principles of German Criminal Procedure (2012) 62.  
93  Section 147 (7) of the German Criminal Procedure Code. 
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ongoing investigations. These restrictions must be based on concrete evidence that show 
potential danger in disclosing such evidence.94 However the non-disclosure based on the risk 
posed to the investigation is justified only on a temporary basis. Once the danger elapses, the 
prosecution must inform the defence that the dossier can now be accessed.   
There is very little literature on the problem of conflicting interest when disclosure is restricted. 
With regard to witness protection however, Turner notes that the German model suggests that 
witness protection measures can be imposed on a case-by-case basis, while retaining open-file 
disclosure as a general rule. 95 The judge can independently investigate the facts of the case and 
also safeguard the fairness of the proceedings.96 Much of the success of the German discovery 
system depends on a large extent on judicial review of the dossier. This provides them with an 
opportunity to make judgements that reflect the true facts of the case.97  
6.2 New Zealand 
New Zealand follows a common law approach in its criminal proceedings where the trial is a 
contest between two parties. Disclosure rules in New Zealand are statutorily grounded in the 
Criminal Disclosure Act, 200898, the Evidence Act, the Criminal Disclosure Act, 2011 and the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. All relevant material in possession of the prosecution, 
                                                          
94  Turner (2105) 7.  
95  Turner (2015)14.  
96  Turner (2015)14. 
97  Turner (2015)14. 
98  The Criminal Disclosure Act provides a comprehensive regime for disclosure by the prosecutors.   
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including exculpatory evidence, must be disclosed to the defence at all stages of the trial.99 
Unlike the German system, there is little emphasis on early discovery. 
The law have adopted various positions where interests may appear to be conflicting. With 
regard to the disclosure of identity of informers, for instance, their identities may not be 
disclosed unless the Judge is of the opinion that such disclosure is necessary to establish the 
innocence of the defendant. Thus information under these grounds may be withheld by the 
prosecution or disclosed in a modified manner. Limitations on national security on the other 
hand, are contained in several statutes. Importantly, section 30(1) (b) of the Criminal Disclosure 
Act provides that the court can order the disclosure of information where the interests in 
favour of disclosure prevail over the reasons for withholding it.  
Another important provision in the Criminal Disclosure Act is that the defence can seek orders 
for disclosure of information from a person other that the prosecutor if such information is 
likely to assist the defence. At any such hearing, the Prosecutor may make submissions on the 
relevance or admissibility of the evidence sought by the defence. Such provisions seek to cure 
the imbalance in investigatory powers between the prosecution and the defence.  
7. Conclusion 
In conducting the investigation and prosecution the prosecution is obliged to protect on-going 
investigations, interest of witnesses, victims and other third parties as well as the integrity of 
the prosecution itself. So far however, the ad hoc tribunals seem to be unable to establish a 
suitable remedy for serious violations of the prosecutions duty to disclose, this may, in part 
                                                          
99  Criminal Disclosure Act 2008, s 13. 
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explain why such violations continue to be rampant.  We can conclude from the 
abovementioned cases that the tension between the two rights is one that is yet to be resolved 
and that there is still no single appropriate remedy to this lacuna. 
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Chapter 4 
The Right to Disclosure at the International Criminal Court 
1. The Prosecution’s Duty to Disclose Evidence: A Legal Dilemma  
The prosecutions duty to disclose evidence to the defence is founded on Article 54(1) (a) which 
sets forth the requirement that the prosecution investigates both incriminating and 
exonerating evidence. In addition Article 67(2) and Rule 77 of the RPE obligate the prosecution 
to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence to the accused. The defences right to disclosure, on 
the other hand is founded on Article 67 of the ICC Statute which provides for the accused 
person to have adequate time and facilities to prepare its defence. Thus in principle, the 
prosecution is mandated to disclose both incriminating and exonerating or exculpatory 
evidence pursuant to its own obligations and to the rights of the accused. The obligation is 
proactive and does not depend on the accused persons request to receive such information. 100  
The basic rule under the ICC Statute is that the prosecutor discloses two clusters of evidence to 
the accused. Firstly, the evidence he intends to use to support the charges. Secondly, evidence 
which may be favourable for both the prosecutors’ case and that of the accused.101 This is 
where the prosecution is often in a dilemma. It is an ‘advocate of the people’ tasked with 
seeking convictions on behalf of the victims, at the same time it also has the duty to investigate 
and establish the truth. Thus, the prosecutors’ duty to disclose both incriminating and 
exonerating evidence creates a competing duty. The conflicting dualism ‘coupled with the 
                                                          
100  Amann G ‘The Disclosure Regime Before The ICC: The Right to a Fair Trial’ 
http://www.heritagetpirdefense.org/papers/Gabriel_Amman_Disclosure_Regime_Before_ICC.pdf (accessed on 
28/04/2015). 
101  Hanna Kuczyńska The Accusation Model Before the International Criminal Court: Study of Convergence of 
Criminal Justice Systems (2015) 198. 
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political and public pressures for convictions…provides the impetus for …prosecutors to opt for 
dishonest conduct and downplay or fail to disclose evidence that is potentially favourable to the 
defence.’102 It may be argued that this is one of the reasons why the prosecution at the ICC may 
fail to disclose potentially exonerating evidence. It may be skewed towards building its own 
case. It seem unrealistic for the prosecutor to actively look for exculpatory evidence and at the 
same time search for evidence with an aim to building a  
The internal conflict doesn’t end here. The Prosecution also grapples with divided allegiances. 
The interests of fair justice demands that full disclosure be meted out, but this is often 
complicated by sensitivity of some information.103 Furthermore, there is the need to generate 
new evidence and not to prejudice ongoing investigations. 104 This may provide a good 
incentive for partiality. The Prosecution may abuse its powers and choose to go with their gut 
feeling by asking which interest makes more sense -disclosing evidence to an accused person, 
protecting a witness or securing an ongoing investigation? Tempting as it might be, the 
prosecution is still required to fully disclose material in its possession to the accused.  
The central role that the prosecution plays in investigation and disclosure of evidence means 
that any omission can adversely affect the entire trial. Thus where there are competing 
interests that may force the prosecution to choose to protect the one interest over another, 
                                                          
102  Klinkosum M ‘Pursuing Discovery in Criminal Cases: Forcing Open the Prosecution’s Files’ available at 
http://www.nacdl.org/Champion.aspx?id=28476 (accessed 20/6/2015) 
103  Such information includes victim protection concerns, confidentiality needs and the security interests of a 
state.  
104   See Fedorova M, Verhoen S & Wouters J Safeguarding the Rights of Suspects and Accused Persons in 
International Criminal Proceedings (2009) 17. 
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one party may be prejudiced. Where does the prosecution draw the line? And how can these 
tensions be reconciled? 
2. Ruling on Exculpatory Evidence 
In case of doubt as to the exculpatory nature of the evidence, the prosecution is allowed to 
make an ex parte application to the judges who will make a decision on whether the material is 
exculpatory and whether it should be disclosed. 105 In Prosecutor v Bemba, the Trial Chamber 
stated that it will not routinely review decisions taken by the OTP in fulfilment of its disclosure 
obligations unless there are reasons to doubt that the duty has been correctly fulfilled. 106 The 
onus lies on the defence to prove that such disclosure obligations were not complied with. The 
trial Chamber is less likely to intervene in the absence of proof that the prosecution did not 
comply with its obligations.  
3. Restrictions on the Prosecutions Disclosure Obligations: Competing Rights and 
Interests 
As noted previously, disclosure is not an absolute right and there are various competing 
interests that may arise when deciding whether or not to disclose information. This chapter 
therefore aims to analyse the competing interests that appear to be the most persistent in the 
ICC and those that will continue to be problematic in future, if the court does not find an 
adequate solution. For that reason, this chapter focuses on the issue of confidentiality 
agreements, witness protection and national security.  
                                                          
105  See Rule 83 of the ICC RPE.  
106  Prosecutor v Bemba, paras.20-22 
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3.1 Restricting Disclosure on Grounds of Confidentiality Agreements (Article 54 (3) (e)) 
Confidentiality agreements between the prosecution and information providers serve as an 
incentive for cooperation between the court and information providers. Thus, there is dire need 
to maintain confidentiality in order for the prosecution to continue investigations and to 
receive delicate information.107 As a result, Article 54(3)(e) of the Rome Statute provides that 
the Prosecutor ‘may […] agree not to disclose, at any stage of the proceedings, documents or 
information that the Prosecutor obtains on the condition of confidentiality and solely for the 
purpose of generating new evidence, unless the provider of the information consents.’ The 
Prosecutor shall take reasonable steps, to obtain the consent of the information provider if 
such information is potentially exculpatory.  
3.1.1 The Legal Ambiguity 
A plain reading of article 54(3) of the ICC Statute shows that there are many unresolved issues. 
First, there is a clear mismatch between article 54(3) and 67(2). The use of confidential 
information by the prosecution may conflict with the prosecutions obligation to disclose 
potentially exculpatory evidence provided under article 67(2). Secondly, the rules fail to answer 
whether confidentiality rules prevail over disclosure. 
In addition, agreements such as those entered with the United Nations do not fall within the 
scope of disclosure. Article 18(3) of the ICC-UN Agreement108 provides as follows; 
                                                          
107  Einarsdóttir KÓ Comparing the Rules of Evidence Applicable Before the ICTY, ICTR and the ICC (LLM thesis, 
University of Iceland,2010) 39.  
108  Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations.  
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the United Nations and the Prosecutor may agree that the United Nations 
provide documents or information to the Prosecutor on condition of 
confidentiality and solely for the purpose of generating new evidence and that 
such documents shall not be disclosed to other organs of the Court or third 
parties, at any stage of the proceedings or thereafter, without the consent of the 
United Nations 
In addition to withholding information to the defence, this provision goes on to withhold 
information to the other organs of the court. Similarly, the U.N peacekeeping mission, MONUC 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo provides has an analogous relationship with the ICC. 
Article 10 (6) of the Memorandum of Understanding entered between them provides for 
confidentiality between the two bodies with regard to ‘documents held by MONUC that are 
provided by the United Nations to the Prosecutor’. Further, the Memorandum provides that 
such information shall be for the purpose of generating new evidence in connection with the 
investigations.109  
Asides from the UN, other information providers can also give information to the prosecution 
and this is also falls under Article 54(3) (e). For such information to be disclosed, their consent 
must be sought, otherwise such information becomes inadmissible.  
The use of such confidential evidence may compromise the fairness of the criminal 
proceedings. In addition, they put the prosecutor in a difficult position vis a vis both the 
defence and Chamber. In the Lubanga case, the prosecution admitted that more than 50% of 
                                                          
109  Article 10(7) of the Memorandum. 
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the evidence it collected was on the basis of confidentiality agreements, including potentially 
exculpatory evidence. However, the information providers including the U.N refused to waive 
the confidentiality. In the intervening time the OTP disclosed alternative materials such as 
excerpts or summaries of potentially exculpatory evidence.  But the Trial Chamber ordered a 
stay of proceedings. Unfortunately, the restraint used by the prosecutors in the ad hoc in in the 
use of confidentiality agreements appears to have been absent in the Lubanga trial, as the 
prosecution relied too heavily on such information.  
The Trial Chamber in Lubanga concluded that the prosecution abused its obligations by 
routinely entering “into confidentiality agreements routinely and for the purpose of gathering 
springboard and lead evidence alike.” In such situations therefore fairness to the accused 
demands a stay of proceedings. Similarly in the Katanga case, the court noted that the 
prosecution extensively gathered documents covered by the confidentiality exception. In doing 
so, it resorted to using article 54(3) not only in exceptional or limited circumstance, but in 
collecting lead evidence.110 The single judge stated that one core factor that the prosecution 
should consider when deciding whether to accept material pursuant to article 54(3) is the risk it 
poses to the defence.  
Subject to such confidentiality agreements, the relevant documents could not be revealed to 
the trial, let alone the defence. Thus it was impossible for the judges to ensure that the 
alternative materials are equivalent to the information contained in the confidential 
                                                          
110  Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Ngudjolo, ICC (PTC) Decision of 20 June 2008 Para 10.  
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documents.111 The question of confidentiality therefore goes deeper than the conflicts between 
the prosecution and the defence. It is also embedded on the question of who controls the 
Prosecutor, is it the ICC Chambers or or in the end the UN? Specifically on the confidentiality 
restriction, there is little if no room for the judges to resolve confidentiality issues. This is 
because the OTP needs the consent of the UN to disclose the evidence, even to the Chamber 
itself. Thus, the judges are dependent on the acquiescence of the UN. The lack of the 
involvement of the Chambers in assessing materials covered under article 54(3) (e) therefore 
looms large. Amendments should be geared towards their increased involvement such that 
non-disclosure does not extend to the Chambers.  
To effectively deal with the issue of confidentiality, Kai Ambos recommends that the 
prosecution should only conclude confidentiality agreements under three conditions: firstly, if 
there is no other ‘normal’ way to obtain the respective information; secondly, if the 
information is absolutely necessary to continue the investigation; and thirdly, the information is 
requested solely for the purpose of generating new evidence.112 In addition, this research paper 
suggests that that disclosure of exculpatory evidence should not be made subject to the 
consent of third parties. Instead where the evidence tends to show the innocence of guilt of the 
accused, it should be disclosed.  
 
 
                                                          
111  War Crimes Research Office The Relationship between the International Criminal Court and the United 
Nations (2009)47. 
112  Ambos K (2009) 556.  
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3.2 Witness Protection  
3.2.1 The Impact of Witness Protection on the Rights of the Accused  
Witness protection is the second ground for withholding disclosure from the defence. 
Investigations during on-going conflicts-as in most of the ICC cases-may put witnesses and 
victims at risk. Whereas the ICTY provides for non-disclosure in ‘exceptional circumstances’ the 
ICC has no similar provision. Article 68 of the ICC Statute generally allows the prosecution not to 
disclose evidence that may put witnesses at risk. This is in conflict with Article 67(1) (e) which 
provides for the accused persons right to examine witnesses.113  
The ICC responds to this tension by take measures to protect victims and witnesses by 
conducting proceedings in camera, protecting witnesses through anonymity or allowing the 
redaction of any information that identifies witnesses, their family members and innocent third 
parties.114 This practice can be at odds with international jurisprudence on the matter. The 
difficulty lies in the application of Article 68 which provides that measures allowing witness 
protection “shall be exercised in a manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the 
rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial”. 
3.2.2 Witness Anonymity 
The rules make it difficult to resolve the conflict. Neither the Rome Statute nor the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence specifically allow or forbid witness anonymity. While this allows for the 
                                                          
113  “[The accused person has a right to] examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him or her and to 
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf under the same conditions as witnesses 
against him or her...” 
114  Article 68 of the ICC-Statute and Rule 81(4) of the RPE.  
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judges to exercise their discretion, it can also allow for inconsistent judgments. It is clear from 
the courts jurisprudence that the identity of witnesses may be withheld from the defense.   
In Lubanga, about 80% of the prosecution witnesses required protection and were in fact 
anonymous- temporarily. 115 The defence only learnt of the identity of the witnesses three 
months prior to the trial. The prosecution routinely missed its disclosure deadlines and the 
proceedings had to be postponed several times. This research paper concludes that the use 
anonymous witness does not fall under Article 68(1) of the ICC-Statute. In addition, if a 
conviction is primarily based on anonymous witnesses and the defence was unable to cross 
examine the witness, this may amount to a miscarriage of justice.  
3.2.3 Witness Credibility  
The prosecution in the Muthaura case omitted to disclose the identity of witnesses and any 
information pertaining to them, regardless of the fact that their evidence formed the basis of 
the confirmation of charges against the accused. The key witness later recanted their evidence 
and admitted to have accepted bribes and as a result the charges were withdrawn.116 If the 
prosecution had disclosed their identity, there were prospects that the charges would have 
never been confirmed. As a result a case that should have not passed the first stage, never 
mind confirmation, was in fact committed to trial. 117  
                                                          
115   Prosecutor v Lubanga Dyilo, ICC (TC) Hearing Transcript 13 February 2008, p19.  
116  Prosecutor v Francis Muthaura and Uhuru Kenyatta, ICC (TC) Decision on the withdrawal of charges 
against Mr Muthaura, 18 March 2013.  
117  Khan KA & Buisman C ‘Sitting on Evidence? Systemic Failings in the ICC Disclosure Regime –Time for 
Reform’ in Stahn C(ed) The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court (2015) 1030.  
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Non-disclosure in Muthaura led to a miscarriage of justice, even despite the fact that the 
charges were withdrawn.  In sum, if the prosecution witnesses cannot be cross-examined, their 
veracity can hardly be tested. This undermines the fundamental principles of a fair trial to the 
accused enshrined both in international conventions and the ICC’s own statute. 
3.2.4 Redactions 
On the basis of the provisions allowing redactions, much of the evidence disclosed has been 
heavily redacted in some cases. Even entire pages may be redacted. This negatively impacts on 
the defence’s ability to investigate and analyse the disclosed material.118 Occasionally, 
complete sentences and even entire paragraphs are redacted making it difficult or even 
impossible for the defence to read and comprehend the evidence. How does the defence 
benefit from heavily redacted information?  
The impact of highly redacted evidence was felt in the Banda and Jerbo case where identities of 
the witnesses which constituted the core charges were withheld from the defence.119 While the 
prosecution only disclosed the evidence very late into the proceedings, the redactions 
genuinely hampered the defence’s investigations since it had no opportunity to visit the 
situation country. Hence, the principle of equality of arms was not adhered to. The ICC 
jurisprudence is skewed towards allowing redactions, even when it involves exculpatory 
evidence. Moreover, the decisions to allow redactions are often ex parte.  
 
                                                          
118  Khan K and Caroline Buisman (2015) 1049.  
119  In this case, the witnesses were persons present in the AU base in Darfur prior to the attack of the base. 
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3.2.5. Witnesses concerns 
Regardless of the foregoing arguments, witnesses also have genuine concerns that arise out of 
disclosure.  120 Asides from the security concerns witnesses may have interests in keeping their 
statements private. They may have spoken about traumatic ordeals or even embarrassing 
situations which they would not like to being disseminated.  Whitting argues that ‘If the 
Prosecution need not disclose information that could jeopardize the security of a witness, then 
it should not’.121 
3.2.6 The Balance 
In the “Decision on disclosure issues, responsibilities for protective measures and other 
procedural matters,” the Trial Chamber in the Lubanga discussed whether interest of protective 
measures for the witnesses and victims overrides the right for the accused person to disclosure. 
On this point, Judge René Blattman opined that both the right to protecting witnesses and the 
right to a fair trial cannot be diminished, but noted that it is difficult to ‘balance the two rights 
and find an acceptable equilibrium that satisfies both parties’.122 He noted that revealing the 
identities of the witnesses may put them at risk and at the same time a fair trial should be 
upheld, in so doing the identities of witnesses should be revealed. The difficulty lies in the fact 
that upholding one right over the other will have negative consequences over the adversary. 
She however concluded that it is debatable whether there is a direct link between the identities 
of witnesses and non-disclosure. However this point is not entirely convincing. 
                                                          
120  Whitting A (2015)1018. 
121  Whitting A (2015) 1018.  
122  Dissenting opinion of Judge Rene Blattman in Prosecutor v Lubanga. 
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This research paper argues that that link can be in fact inferred based on the fact that non-
disclosure undermines effective cross examination and therefore the trustworthiness of 
witness testimony. The Muthaura case is a good example.  
3.3 National security interests and the rights of the accused 
The third possible justification for non-disclosure is when evidence touches on the national 
security interests. To date, there is no indication that this provision has ever been invoked by a 
state, thus this research paper will only give a statutory interpretation of the provisions.  Article 
72 provides that ‘the disclosure of the information or documents of a State would, in the 
opinion of that State, prejudice its national security interests.’ In accordance with article 72, a 
State Party may deny a request for assistance if the request concerns ‘the production of any 
documents or disclosure of evidence which relates to its national security.’123 This exemption 
clause in the ICC Statute falls short of the standards set by the ICTY. Article 29(2) of the ICTY 
Statute requires states to ‘comply without undue delay with any request for assistance or an 
order issued by a Trial Chamber, including, but not limited to…the production of evidence’.  
There are four possible ways in which information may be withheld. First, the State may be in 
possession of relevant evidence but refuses to produce it on grounds of national security. 
Second, a person may refuse to give information or evidence or has referred the matter to the 
State on the ground that disclosure would prejudice its national security interests and the state 
confirms that that such disclosure would prejudice its interests. 124 Third, the Defence or the 
Prosecutor is in possession of information. What is different about Article 72, as opposed to 
                                                          
123  Article 93(4) of the ICC Statute.  
124  Article 72(2) of the ICC Statute.  
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other situations discussed in this paper, is that the Prosecution itself may or may not be in 
possession of the evidence. The application of Article 72 therefore raises several important 
issues relating not only to the rights of the accused but also to a number of organs of the ICC.  
3.3.6 Non-disclosure by the State 
Where a State learns of the likelihood of disclosure at any stage of the proceedings and it feels 
like such information would prejudice its national security interests it has the right to 
intervene.125 It may take all reasonable steps to resolve the matter by cooperative means 
including a modification of the request, determination by the Court on the relevance of 
information sought, obtaining information from a different source or using other protective 
measures.126 And the Court must determine whether such evidence is potentially exculpatory. 
But the last word as regarding whether or not to disclose rests on the state. When one 
compares the Blaškić case with the relevant provisions of the ICC Statute the Blaškić arguments 
on are not applicable to the ICC.  
The problem with applying Article 72 is two-fold: the State may refuse to give evidence when it 
is trying to shield someone. A typical instance is where the Head of State being prosecuted. 
Furthermore, the state might invoke the provision in order to try to conceal that the state 
agencies committed the crime. On the other hand, the state may want to silence political 
opponents or ‘scores to settle with an accused, and use the national security card to 
manipulate the evidence before the Court.’127  
                                                          
125  Article 72(4) of the ICC Statute. 
126  Article 72(5) of the ICC Statute. 
127  Schabas W (2002) 109.  
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All the above instances will have an adverse impact on the effective investigation and 
prosecution of cases. Firstly, it may prejudice the defence’s interest in adequately preparing for 
the trial. Secondly, it may lead to a wrong confirmation of charges and conviction hence 
conflicting with the interest of justice. Lastly, it could adversely affect the prosecutions 
investigation and prosecution capacity when the evidence is crucial to the proceedings. The 
interest of the ICC in putting an end to impunity for perpetrators of international crimes may be 
jeopardized by putting exaggerated emphasis on the national security.  As noted earlier most 
international crimes such as genocide are linked to national security issue. Disclosing such 
evidence should therefore be the rule rather than the exception. 128  
3.3.7 Non –disclosure by an individual 
An individual may also withhold disclosure on the basis of national security interests when 
compelled to testify. This will have similar consequences to the defence and the prosecution. 
The fundamental difference between evidence in the possession of an individual and that in 
possession of a state is that in the former, the court may order that that evidence be produced. 
There is no room for negotiations and agreements.  
3.3.4 Evidence in possession of the prosecution or defence 
The third scenario is where the evidence may be in the possession of either the defence or the 
prosecution and a state is entitled to object to its disclosure. It goes without saying that if the 
evidence is exculpatory, the defence will produce it in court. However, if the State objects to 
                                                          
128  Zemach A ‘National Security Evidence: Enhancing Fairness in View of the Non-Disclosure Regime of the 
Rome Statute’ (2014) 4 Israeli Law Review 333.  
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such disclosure, the court will determine whether such information can be disclosed. 
Regrettably, an order to disclose such evidence would breach on the defences right to not be 
compelled to testify or to confess guilt and to remain silence under Article 67(1) (g).129The 
situation is somewhat different when the evidence is in the possession of the prosecution. The 
overriding principle is that it must disclose exculpatory information as soon as practicable. But 
such disclosure is restricted under Article 72.  
It is also not clear how the rules on national security interests will relate to other provisions on 
non-disclosure. For instance, the content of the evidence produced by an informant may touch 
on national security and is at the same time based on confidentiality agreements. What if a 
state becomes aware of this information and seeks to prevent disclosure? Which provision will 
the ICC use, Article 54(3) (e) or Article 72?  On the one hand, confidentiality agreements are 
allowed for the sole purpose of generating new evidence and on the other hand a state can 
object to disclosure on grounds of protecting its national security interests. It would seem more 
appealing for states to withhold information under article 54 than 72 as it allows states to 
withhold information. 
4. How Can the Court Intervene?  
The ICC Statute provides a weak framework under which the Trial Chamber can participate in 
the disclosure. Article 67(2) only provides that ‘in case of doubt as to the application [of 
disclosure], the Court shall decide.’ This is why in Lubanga the Trial Chamber opined that the 
primary duty lies on the parties to identify relevant material, the Chambers only have powers to 
                                                          
129  Schabas W (2002) 111.  
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intervene. Similarly, in Prosecutor v Bemba, the Trial Chamber stated that it will not routinely 
review decisions taken by the OTP in fulfilment of its disclosure obligations unless there are 
reasons to doubt that the duty has been correctly fulfilled. 130 Rule 84 also empowers the 
Chamber to order disclosure of information not previously disclosed before the trial 
commences. The onus lies on the defence to prove that such disclosure obligations were not 
complied with. However, full access of the prosecution file would allow the judges to make an 
informed decision where tensions exist.  
5. Conclusion 
If we look at the emerging jurisprudence of the ICC we may conclude that some weaknesses 
emerge. In fact, on one side, we have judges who are watching from the side-lines and we have 
two adversaries. The judges are passive and only come into play when there is a contest 
between the defence and the prosecution. The system is only based on the parties’ initiatives. 
Unlike in the inquisitorial systems there is no dossier or checklist for both parties which act as a 
standard for preparing the evidence. In addition, the duty to disclose is based purely on the 
evidence selected by the Prosecutor. Even in cases where the ICC Statute provides that 
exculpatory evidence is disclosed, the choice still is on the party on which the duty is 
imposed.131 The practice of ICC Chambers, however, implies that it is difficult to balance the 
competing rights.  
                                                          
130  Prosecutor v Bemba ICC (TC), decision of 2 December, 2009 paras.20-22. 
131  M. Caianiello (2010) 39.  
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In essence, it is the interpretation of the dual role of the prosecutor to disclose potentially 
exculpatory evidence that has proven difficult. At the end of the day, there is no doubt that the 
degree of flexibility has led to an unsettled practice with regard to disclosure as well as an 
unbalanced disclosure regime. But given the challenges posed by various interests, it must be 
understood that the entire disclosure process requires the active participation of the parties 
and judges. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
By analysing the prosecutions disclosure obligations and the competing rights this research 
paper has examined contentious disclosure issues that face the ICC. Also the issues which the 
ad hoc tribunals face in this regard were addressed.   The research illustrates the importance of 
disclosure obligations within the broader goals of achieving a fair trial. All the mentioned 
judicial organs in the preceding chapters reveal that the prosecutor must disclose to the 
defence both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence in his/her possession.  
It appears from the ICC jurisprudence that there is need of improvement in the current 
disclosure regime. The case of Muthaura is a clear example of the direct consequence of non-
disclosure or faulty disclosure. If the charges against the accused here were confirmed based on 
non-disclosure, it means that in future an accused person can be wrongly convicted. If ‘trials are 
unfair, or perceived to be unfair, international criminal courts ... might quickly lose their 
legitimacy. Worse still, the entire enterprise of justice for these types of heinous crime–
whether in international courts, domestic courts, or otherwise–might be dealt a serious 
blow’.132 
This research paper also established that the right of the accused to a fair trial, witnesses’ right 
to protection, and informant’s interests in confidentiality and the states interests in protecting 
national security may be in conflict. And this has led the ICC Chambers to adopt several 
                                                          
132  Jacob Katz Cogan, ‘International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties and Prospects’ (2002) 27 Yale 
Journal of International Law 122.  
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remedies which represent an attempt to balance the competing interests. In order to ensure 
that the rights of third parties are not detrimental to the rights of the accused, the Chambers 
have introduced the use of summaries and redactions. In addition, the Trial Chamber in 
Lubanga concluded that the appropriate remedy for the prosecutions omission would be to 
stay the proceedings and an interim release of the accused.  
Even though some of the rules of the ad hoc tribunals were taken into account in the drafting of 
the ICC Statute, several important issues are left to the discretion of the court, such as how to 
resolve the tension between competing interests. The absence of clear rules and standards can 
lead to inconsistent outcomes and ‘involve courts in controversial policymaking’.133   Even if the 
court opts for a case-by-case approach, it should be guided by specific rules as a reference 
point. Perhaps, still in this area, the ICC should take the ad hoc Tribunals as possible role 
models.  
The advantage offered by balancing the rights is that it gives judges an opportunity to critically 
analyse the interests when they are considering a suitable remedy. In addition, balancing 
practices show the all the needs of the various actors are taken into consideration.134 Where 
the court is actively involved, it could easily detect the failure to disclose evidence early in the 
proceedings. In those circumstances, any harm suffered by the defendant as a result of non-
disclosure will be less significant that when the violation is addressed later into the trial.  
 
                                                          
133  Turner J ‘Policing International Prosecutors’ (2015) 45 International Law and Politics 182.  
134  Turner J (2015)147.  
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The court must therefore find a way to accommodate the competing rights and interests 
without overly restricting any of them. Undoubtedly, the accused has a right to fair trial under 
human rights law. At the same time, other legitimate concerns should be considered. For the 
consistent application of this balance, the court must spell out the factors that it relies on when 
coming up with the balancing test. This would include the various interests at stake. This will 
make the ICC more predictable. By establishing coherent rules, the ICC can achieve an approach 
that is both effective and able to accommodate the competing interests. Like the Special 
Tribunal of Lebanon, the ICC should make specific mention of counter-balancing measures 
when there are competing rights in its Rules of Procedure and Evidence.  
In sum, to bring clarity to the issue of competing rights and interests; there should be fair trial 
rules that provide prosecutors and courts with clear guidance on how to balance these rights. It 
is undeniable that the Rules of Procedure and Evidence cannot account for all situations that 
arise before the ICC. For that reason is its essential to weigh the available options where 
conflicts arise and the court must find an adequate solution.  The ICC should serve as a global 
model of criminal procedure.135 
1. Recommendations  
1.1 The competing interests 
1.1.1 Confidential agreements 
When the prosecution obtains confidential evidence, he should not solely rely on it as a basis of 
his case. It should use it as a stepping stone to get more evidence. Had the OTP used the 
evidence form the UN as a stepping stone in the Lubanga case, it would have relied less on 
                                                          
135  Turner J (2015)257. 
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confidential evidence. The issue of disclosure of exculpatory evidence might have not arisen.136 
There are two recommendations here. First, that the prosecution should restrict the use of 
confidential agreements in its investigations. Second, information based on confidentiality 
agreements is accepted by the prosecution, when and if disclosure comes into issue, disclosing 
such information should be not be primarily subject to consent of the third parties. The court 
should have a say in such instances.   
1.1.2 Witness identity 
The current dilemma facing the ICC, as well as other international tribunals to either protect 
witnesses to the detriment of the accused or vice versa may be resolved by specifically 
providing whether testimonies of anonymous witnesses are allowed, this should not be left to 
the Courts interpretation but rather specifically provided in the Rules of Procedure and 
evidence.137 In addition, ICC could consider using the Tadic decision providing a test on 
permitting anonymous witness testimony. The test is as follows: 
1. There must be real fear of witness safety of the identity is disclosed 
2. The testimony must be relevant to the prosecution’s case such that it will hinder its case 
if allowed to proceed without it. 
3. The Chamber must be satisfied of the credibility of the witness. 
                                                          
136  Katzman R ‘The Non-disclosure of Confidential Exculpatory Evidence and the Lubanga Proceedings: How 
the ICC Defense System Affects the Accused’s Right to a Fair Trial’ (2009) 8 Northwestern Journal of International 
Human 99.  
137  Anna M. Haughton The balancing of the rights of the accused against the rights of a witness  
in regard to anonymous testimony. http://www.nesl.edu/userfiles/file/wcmemos/2001/haughton.pdf (accessed 
on 6/10/2015).  
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4. The ability or inability to provide protection for witnesses should have a considerable 
weight when evaluating whether or not to grant anonymity. 
5.  The accused must not suffer additional prejudice as a result of granting anonymity.  
Withholding information from the defence on the basis of witness protection should be only 
justified when there are serious security threats. Like at the ICTY, non-disclosure should only be 
permitted in ‘exceptional circumstances’ such that mere fears of witness do not suffice; it must 
be demonstrated that there is a real likelihood of danger.  Another option for the ICC is to limit 
the use of redactions.  Alternatively, testimonies of anonymous witnesses should be totally 
excluded if it will not be disclosed to the defence. In sum, full disclosure should be the rule and 
witness protection the exception. 
1.1.3 National security interests 
The general rule should be that information on violations on international criminal law should 
be subject to disclosure. In addition, guidance can be sought from the ‘Global Principles on 
National Security and the Right to Information’ which elaborates on the issue of disclosure and 
national security.  According to the principles, an application to withhold information based on 
security interests should only be justified if the government can demonstrate that the 
restriction (1) is prescribed by domestic law (2) is necessary in a democratic society (3) and 
required to protect legitimate security interests.138 In addition to the four grounds, the ICC 
should consider the adding prescription by international law as a ground for justification. Such 
ground will filter our frivolous national security claims.  
                                                          
138   Principle 3 of the Global Principles on National Security and the Right to Information.  
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1.2 The prosecution 
1.2.1 Sanctions for prosecutions wilful non-disclosure  
Unfortunately, there is still no appropriate remedy at the ICC, for breach of the prosecution 
duty to disclose in situations where the fairness of a trial has been compromised. It is suggested 
that a permanent stay of proceedings is too drastic a measure.139 But this assertion is anchored 
on the reasoning that those who committed crime under international law must not go 
unpunished. The ICC should therefore adopt a remedy that is in proportion to the breach and at 
the same time safeguard the rights of the accused. The basic presumption is that such a rule 
will have a deterrent effect on deliberate non-disclosures.  
1.2.2 Transparency in reasons for non-disclosure 
At the onset of the trial, the prosecution should provide reasons as to why it should withhold 
evidence. This will reduce the number of disputes where the defence alleges that the 
prosecution failed to disclose information because reasons for non-disclosure or applications 
for non-disclosure will be known to both the court and the defence at the onset of the trial.  
1.3 The ICC Chambers 
1.3.1 Judicial control over the disclosure process  
While acknowledging the crucial role that the prosecution plays in the disclosure process, the 
development of the ad hoc tribunals and ICC rules has shown that there is great need for the 
judge to be actively involved in the disclosure phase. The judge would be more cognisant of the 
facts and evidence in the case as all the documents pertaining to the case are placed in a 
                                                          
139  International Bar Association Fairness at the International Criminal Court (2011) 9.  
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dossier.  In this regard, the judges should not only participate in the disclosure process when 
disputes arise. It will be extremely important that the judges actively participate in disclosure.  
1.3.2 Open-file system 
The Court should consider adopting an open-file system which allows the defence access to all 
the relevant materials relating to the investigation. The advantages in this approach are that 
exculpatory material will be more accessible to the defence as the investigation develops. In 
addition, judges should also be given the collection of evidentiary documents prepared by the 
prosecution prior to the trial. The role that the dossier can play in the ICC’S proceedings should 
not be underestimated. 
1.3.3 Early disclosure 
All disclosure issues should be dealt with before the trial commences. Any disclosure after 
commencement of the proceedings should only be permitted in limited circumstances such as 
when witnesses at serious risk haven’t yet been protected. Thus, rules should be enacted to 
ensure that the defence receives early disclosure of witness information and on the other hand 
offences concerning witness intimidation should be enacted. If the ICC takes this approach, it 
must enact penalties that deter the defence from misusing information provided through 
disclosure. 
1.4 The office of the defence as the fifth organ of the ICC.  
The office of the defence should be established as a permanent organ of the court, in addition 
to the Presidency, the judicial Divisions, the Office of the Prosecutor and the Registry. This will 
cure the imbalance between the prosecution and defence in investigations and resources.  Thus 
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a head of defence should be appointed to protect the rights of the accused and the defence. 
The new law should provide guarantees that ensure ‘equality of arms’ with the prosecution at 
least at the pre-trial stage. This will allow for defence investigations. 
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ANNEXTURE 
PROPOSED PROTOCOL ON DISCLOSURE OF EVIDENCE BY THE ICC PROSECUTION 
 
PREAMBLE 
Recognizing the centrality of disclosure in criminal proceedings, this protocol provides a clear 
guidance on the prosecutions duty to disclose evidence with an attempt to balance competing 
interests that arise as a result of that duty. The purpose of this protocol therefore is to 
harmonise the several provisions on disclosure. It is drafted for adoption by the ICC to 
supplement the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.  
 
Article 1 
Definitions 
For the purposes of this proposed protocol: 
(a) “Disclosure” refers to the act of providing to the defence evidence in the possession of the 
prosecution which may be relevant to the case. 
(b) “Legitimate national security interests” refers to genuine interests intended to protect 
national security which are consistent with national and international law.  
(c) “National security” refers to genuine security interest.  
(d) “Non-party” refers to an individual or agency that is not party to the proceedings. 
 
Article 2  
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Disclosure of evidence by the prosecution 
1.  As soon as the criminal proceedings commence the prosecutor must disclose 
both inculpatory evidence and evidence that shows or tends to show the 
innocence of the accused, or mitigates the guilt of the accused, or which may 
affect the credibility of prosecution evidence. 
2.  The prosecution must make full disclose to the defence the information 
described in subsection (1) prior to the confirmation of charges unless the 
information may be withheld subject to the consent of the Court. 
3.   The prosecution shall disclose to the defence any information or evidence 
referred to in subsection (1) if and when it comes into the possession or control 
of the prosecution after the initial disclosure and before the trial is completed.  
4.  An open file of the prosecution evidence shall be deposited at the Registry and 
shall be accessible to the Court and the defence.  
Article 3 
Disclosure of the identity of witnesses  
1.  Unless provided otherwise the prosecution must disclose to the defence the 
identity of the witness that it intends to call to give evidence at the trial.   
2.  Where revealing the identity of a witness may pose a risk to the witness, the 
prosecution may notify the defence in advance of the risk and make an ex parte 
application to the Pre Trial Chamber for an order to withhold disclosure.  
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3.  An application under subsection (2) must be accompanied by a statement from 
the Victims and Witnesses Unit acknowledging that the witness is at risk and 
identifying appropriate protection measures.  
4.   For purposes of any proceedings before the court, the contact address of victims 
and witnesses shall be that of their respective lawyers.  
5.  The public shall be excluded from any proceedings in cases where the safety or 
non-disclosure of witness identity is in issue.  
Article 4 
Disclosure of evidence obtained on the basis of confidentiality 
1.  The prosecution shall only obtain evidence on the basis of confidentiality 
agreements with third parties if: 
(a)   there is no other practical way to obtain evidence;  
(b)   the information has a high probative value; and 
(c)   the information is necessary for the preparation of the prosecution’s 
case. 
2.  Information obtained under this section shall not be used as lead evidence but 
only for the purpose of generating new evidence.  
3.  Any disclosure under this section shall not be made subject to the consent of 
third parties.  
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Article 5 
Disclosure of evidence relating to national security  
Any information regarding gross violations of human rights or humanitarian law or other 
violations of international law may not be withheld on grounds of national security in a manner 
that prevents investigations and accountability for the violations. Only legitimate national 
security interest which may prejudice a state if disclosed may be withheld from the defence. 
Article 6 
Non-disclosure orders 
1.  The prosecution may make an application to the Court for non-disclosure. In its 
application it shall satisfy that non-disclosure is necessary in the interests of 
justice and outweighs any prejudice to the accused.  
2.  The Court may make a full order or conditional order for non –disclosure. 
3.  Where the chamber grants an order under section (1) and (2) and the prosecutor 
becomes aware that the justification for such an order ceases to exist, the 
prosecution shall as soon as practicable disclose this fact to the chamber and the 
defence. 
Article 7 
Alternative measures 
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1.  Subject to Article 5(1) the Prosecutor shall  provide reasons for withholding 
evidence and propose alternative measures that will not prejudice the accused 
right to disclosure.  
2.   Where the Prosecutor cannot provide alternative measures, he/she shall either: 
(a) disclose the information; or  
(b) proceed without the undisclosed evidence.  
Article 8 
Failure to Comply with Disclosure Obligations  
The Court may decide proprio motu, or at the request of the defence, on appropriate 
disciplinary action to be imposed on prosecution if it fails to perform its disclosure obligations 
pursuant to this Protocol.  
Article 9 
Disclosure by non-parties 
1.  This section applies where non-parties may be in possession of inculpatory or 
exculpatory evidence.  
2.  The defence may make an application to the court to determine whether third 
party evidence should be disclosed to the defence. The application must- 
(a) describe the information and details of the third party; 
(b) establish the relevance of the information; and   
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(c) state any reasonable attempts to obtain the material from the non-party. 
3.  The prosecution may make written submissions to the court regarding the 
application. 
 
 
.  
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